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FROM AFFORDABLE TO PROFITABLE: THE PRIVATIZATION
OF MITCHELL-LAMA HOUSING & HOW THE NEW YORK
COURT OF APPEALS GOT IT WRONG
Camille Rosca
I. INTRODUCTION
With the upturn in the economy since the 2008 financial crisis,
demand for residential real estate in New York City has increased,
resulting in heightened tensions with the city’s efforts to maintain
affordable housing units, especially for low- and middle-income
individuals. Specifically, New York City must confront the increasing
loss of affordable housing through the conversions of public and quasipublic units to private, for-profit accommodations in light of the
growing demand for residential space and the high return of these
conversions. In addition to factors like income and rental rates, the
general availability of housing stock—which is directly affected by
these for-profit conversions—significantly impacts whether New York
City can maintain affordable housing for future years. Based on a
combination of these factors (e.g., income, rental rates, and availability
of housing stock), a recent study indicates that New York City now
ranks thirty-first among the seventy-six largest cities with regard to
gross rent-to-income ratios, demonstrating the pressing reality of New
York City’s affordable housing dilemma.1
Generally, housing is considered affordable when a household
pays no more than thirty percent of its income to rent; the 2011
Housing and Vacancy Survey (“HVS”), however, reported that the
median gross rent-to-income ratio for all renters in New York City was


J.D. candidate, 2015, Seton Hall School of Law; B.A., 2011, Villanova University. I
would extend my deepest appreciation to Professor Angela C. Carmella for her
continued guidance and assistance in helping to shape this comment to completion
and to Erica F. Buckley, Bureau Chief at the Office of the Attorney General of the State
of New York, for providing me with the opportunity to learn about the Mitchell-Lama
housing program.
1
2014 Income and Affordability Study, NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD. 3, 8–9
(Apr. 10, 2014), available at http://www.nycrgb.org/downloads/research/pdf_
reports/ia14.pdf (“Despite ongoing efforts by a number of government agencies and
non-profit groups, housing affordability remains an issue . . . .”).

945

ROSCA(DO NOT DELETE)

946

6/22/2015 5:10 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:945

33.6 percent.2 This ratio means that half of all households residing in
rental housing pay more than 33.6 percent of their income to gross
rent, placing New York City rental housing outside the purview of
housing that is considered affordable.3 Furthermore, the cost of living
in New York City as compared to larger cities nationwide is high.
According to the Council for Community and Economic Research’s
Cost of Living Index (“COLI”), which tracks the cost of living in more
than 300 urban areas, Manhattan is approximately 2.2 times more
expensive to live in than the national average, Brooklyn is
approximately 1.7 times more expensive, and Queens is roughly 1.5
times more expensive.4 This same study found that significantly more
income is required to live in New York City even compared to Boston,
given the same living standards.5 Someone moving from Boston who
makes $51,642 a year would need to make $81,978 to have the same
living conditions in Manhattan with respect to groceries,
transportation, and housing.6 The Housing Opportunity Index
(“HOI”) also found that between 2008 and 2012, the New York City
metropolitan area was the least affordable area to buy a home in for
the eighteenth straight quarter.7 Therefore, preserving affordable
housing units in New York City is imperative, especially for low- and
middle-income families, given that the general living costs in the city
are high even in comparison to other large cities nationwide.
In addition to analyzing the rent-to-income ratio as a measure of
New York City’s need to maintain and provide affordable housing,
poverty and unemployment rates are also significant indicators. For
example, while the New York City unemployment rate fell to 8.7
percent in 2013 (after a 0.2 percentage point increase in 2012), it still
remained above the U.S. unemployment rate of 7.4 percent.8 This 1.3
percentage point difference between the city’s unemployment rate
and the national unemployment rate is the largest gap between the two

2

2013 Income and Affordability Study, NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD. 3, 9
(Apr. 4, 2013), available at http://www.nycrgb.org/downloads/research/pdf_
reports/ia13.pdf; see also 2014 Income and Affordability Study, supra note 1, at 8.
3
2013 Income and Affordability Study, supra note 2, at 8–9 (stating that for 2011, the
median income for all rental households was $38,447, and rent-controlled tenants
continued to have the lowest household income, earning a median of $28,000 in
2010).
4
2014 Income and Affordability Study, supra note 1, at 10–11.
5
Id. at 11.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 5.
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figures since 2004.9 Moreover, the Census Bureau reports that the New
York City poverty rate for all individuals was 21.2 percent in 2012, an
increase from 20.9 percent in the previous year and 5.3 percent higher
than the national poverty rate.10 Poverty rates, however, vary widely
depending on the borough. Rates range from as low as 11.6 percent
in Staten Island to 31.0 percent in the Bronx.11 Nevertheless, these
statistics indicate that maintaining affordable housing in New York City
has become a challenge considering the high cost of living and the
growing disparity between rent and income.
Yet, despite the high poverty and unemployment rates in certain
boroughs, a shortage of affordable housing stock remains. According
to the HVS of 2011, the New York City vacancy rate for housing
inventory was 3.12 percent, which was below the five percent threshold
required for rent regulation to continue under state law.12 This low
vacancy rate translates into the availability of just 67,818 vacant units
out of more than 2.1 million rental units city-wide.13
In addition to the limited housing stock, New York City also faces
poor housing conditions due to overcrowding. For example, 11.5
percent of all rental housing in New York City in 2011 was overcrowded
(defined as more than one person per room, on average) and 4.3
percent was severely overcrowded (defined as an average of more than
1.5 persons per room).14 Thus, even the current housing units in use
for the purpose of providing affordable housing implicate quality
concerns due to the large volume of residents forced to live in limited
spaces. Any further erosion of affordable housing stock would not only
prevent certain families from receiving affordable housing, but it
would also increase the current problem of overcrowding.
In an attempt to provide much needed low-cost, sanitary housing,
New York City has created different forms of housing units and passed
legislation, including both public housing and rent control laws. The
purpose of public housing is to provide decent and safe rental housing
for eligible low-income families, the elderly, and persons with
disabilities.15 Public housing comes in all sizes and types, from
9

Id.
2014 Income and Affordability Study, supra note 1, at 7–8 (discussing that the
national poverty rate was “15.9% for the nation as a whole in both 2011 and 2012”).
11
Id.
12
2014 Housing Supply Report, NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BOARD 3 (May 29,
2014), available at http://nycrgb.org/downloads/research/pdf_reports/14HSR.pdf.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 4.
15
HUD’s Public Housing Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
10
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scattered single family houses to high-rise apartments for the elderly.16
Unlike private apartments subject to rent control laws, public housing
is built and maintained by a government authority or office.17 In
contrast, rent control laws operate in the private sector by protecting
vulnerable tenants living in privately operated units from excessive or
sudden increases in rent.18 Public housing and private units regulated
by rent control laws are only two examples of how both private and
public efforts are essential to maintaining affordable housing for the
future.
Limited dividend housing is another type of affordable housing
created through a combination of public and private efforts. Chapter
823 of the State Housing Law of 1926 establishes limited dividend
housing for the purpose of correcting housing conditions that were
considered a menace to the health, safety, morals, welfare, and
reasonable comfort of the citizens of the state.19 The limited dividend
housing program encouraged the development of safe and affordable
housing by providing developers with real estate tax exemptions for a
period of up to fifty years in exchange for a six percent limitation on
profits.20
The existence of these different types of housing
accommodations demonstrates that each model and legislation plays a
different but significant role in preserving affordable housing in New
York City.
This Comment specifically focuses on the housing units formed
under Article II of the New York Private Housing Finance Law
(“PHFL”). The PHFL is a compilation of various programs relating to
state and municipal assistance for housing developed by private
entities, which were previously contained in the Public Housing Law
or had been enacted as separate unconsolidated laws.21 In 1955,

DEVELOPMENT (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/topics/rental_assistance/phprog.
16
Id.
17
Jennifer C. McScotts, Dwelling Together: Using Cooperative Housing to Abate the
Affordable Housing Shortage in Canada and the United States, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
131, 137 (2004).
18
Id. at 140.
19
Gail Benzman & Christopher Boyd, Affordable No More: New York City’s Looming
Crisis in Mitchell-Lama and Limited Dividend Housing, CITY OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER 1, 6 (Feb. 18, 2004), available at http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wpcontent/uploads/documents/Feb18-04_Mitchell-Lama_Report.pdf
[hereinafter
Affordable No More].
20
Id. at 7.
21
David J. Sweet & John D. Hack, Mitchell-Lama Buyout: Policy Issues and Alternatives,
17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117, 117 n.1 (1989).
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Senator MacNeil Mitchell and Assemblyman Alfred Lama sponsored
legislation to amend the PHFL with the addition of Article II,
establishing another type of affordable housing known as MitchellLama housing.22 In 1961, the legislature amended the PHFL again to
incorporate the already-existing limited dividend housing program
and placed the PHFL under the supervision of the Department of
Housing and Community Renewal (“DHCR”).23 With both limited
dividend housing and Mitchell-Lama housing, these programs built
292 housing developments (totaling more than 149,000 units of
affordable housing) in New York City between 1928 and 1978; the vast
majority of these developments, after 1955, were Mitchell-Lama
housing.24 For both programs, the respective supervising agencies
strictly controlled cooperative maintenance charges and rent increases
to ensure their long-term affordability.25
Presently, much-needed affordable housing stock, specifically
Mitchell-Lama housing, is at risk of being lost. Housing developments
representing more than 6,500 units of affordable housing are in the
process of leaving the supervision of Mitchell-Lama and limited
dividend housing programs.26 From an estimation provided by the
New York City Comptroller, at least fifty-nine Mitchell-Lama
developments, representing 40,000 units of affordable housing, are
scheduled to retire their subsidized mortgages and withdraw from the
Mitchell-Lama program between 2004 and 2016.27 Between 2004 and
2007 alone, the Mitchell-Lama program has experienced an annual
loss of more than 5,000 units.28 Throughout New York City, HVS
estimates that existing vacancy rates could not begin to meet the
growing demand for affordable housing.29 The Census reported that
in some areas of New York City, there is virtually no vacant affordable
housing stock.30
In light of the pressing public policy concerns to preserve
affordable housing, like Mitchell-Lama housing, government efforts
22

Maria Cristiano Anderson & Paula A. Franzese, Article: Solutions to the Crisis in
Affordable Housing: Proposed Model for New York City, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. PUB. POL’Y 84,
87–88 (2006).
23
Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 3.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 16.
27
Id.
28
2014 Housing Supply Report, supra note 12, at 8.
29
Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 16.
30
Id.
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should focus on maintaining the limited affordable housing stock that
remains. This includes prohibiting individuals from converting
Mitchell-Lama housing into private market rate housing without
realizing the tax consequences of these transfers. Courts have recently
had the opportunity to interpret state and city tax laws in favor of
preserving much needed affordable housing stock (in the form of
Mitchell-Lama housing). But the New York Court of Appeals did
precisely the opposite when, on December 17, 2014, it affirmed the
holding in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, an appellate
court decision to privatize Mitchell-Lama housing without tax
consequences.31 This decision severely undermined the urgent need
to preserve affordable housing in New York City.
Mitchell-Lama housing consists of both rental projects and
cooperatives, but this Comment focuses primarily on the dissolution of
Mitchell-Lama cooperatives, specifically the means by which these
cooperatives exit out of the Mitchell-Lama program. The purpose of
this Comment is to demonstrate how Trump Village Section 3, Inc. was
wrongly decided. In this case, the Court of Appeals interpreted the
relevant state and tax laws to permit Mitchell-Lama housing companies
to take advantage of real estate tax exemptions both in the initial
formation of the Mitchell-Lama housing company and now at the
dissolution stage. This decision prevents New York City from collecting
necessary tax revenue and incentivizes other Mitchell-Lama
cooperatives to privatize in a manner that circumvents real property
transfer tax requirements. Specifically, this Comment demonstrates
that the way a Mitchell-Lama cooperative dissolves and reconstitutes
into a private market rate cooperative is analogous to how a private
corporation dissolves and reincorporates into a new corporation for
both tax and securities law purposes. In contrast to its holding, the
Court of Appeals should have recognized these conversions to
constitute “transfers” under the relevant tax laws. Thus, these
conversions should be subject to the same tax consequences that would
be implicated if a private housing corporation outside the MitchellLama program had attempted to dissolve.
Part II of this Comment discusses the importance of preserving
Mitchell-Lama housing stock. Part III of this Comment provides
background about Article II of the PHFL and how the Mitchell-Lama
Housing Program operates. It also discusses a prior New York Court
of Appeals decision, which already recognized the dissolution of a

31

Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014).
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Mitchell-Lama cooperative as an “offering” under securities law,
subjecting the dissolution of these cooperatives to disclosure
requirements and supervision by the New York State Attorney General.
Part IV of this Comment provides the factual background of Trump
Village Section 3, Inc. and its procedural history. Part V of this Comment
discusses how the New York Court of Appeals wrongly decided Trump
Village Section 3, Inc. It also offers reasons for why the relevant real
property transfer taxes should apply to all Mitchell-Lama for-profit
cooperative conversions, regardless of how the privatization is
effectuated. Part VI concludes.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING MITCHELL-LAMA HOUSING
COOPERATIVES
Mitchell-Lama Housing is a successful and unique form of
affordable housing. The program’s inception was the first time a law
in New York authorized state and local low-cost loans for private
middle-income housing developments, in addition to condemnation
and tax exemptions, and it appropriated $50 million for this purpose.32
Combined with the extensive federal subsidies available under Title I
of the 1949 Housing Act, the Mitchell-Lama program eventually
produced 269 developments across the state with more than 105,000
units.33 Mitchell-Lama cooperative housing falls under the category of
“social housing” which is non-profit and non-governmental housing.34
Sometimes, however, social housing is affected by government
intervention through subsidies or privatization programs, which is how
Mitchell-Lama cooperatives are able to operate at below-market-rate
rent costs.35 These types of limited equity housing cooperatives are
powerful options for communities organizing against gentrification
and displacement because, while they are supported by government
intervention, they still empower the tenants by providing a vehicle for
ownership in real property.36
New York City is not the only place that has attempted to use
models of social housing, like Mitchell-Lama cooperatives, to confront
the issue of affordable housing. For example, the Canadian National
Housing Act (“CNHA”) provides the means for cooperative
32

Amy Lavine, From Slum Clearance to Economic Development: A Retrospective of
Redevelopment Policies in New York, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 212, 249 (2011).
33
Id.
34
McScotts, supra note 17, at 138.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 150.
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development aimed at the purpose of affordable housing.37 Housing
cooperatives created under Section 95 of the CNHA are considerably
less expensive to operate when compared to similar public housing.38
The difference in cost can be attributed to the fact that housing in
Canada leans toward mixed income communities while public housing
is strictly low income.39 Operating a Section 95 cooperative is twenty
percent less expensive than public or private non-profit housing,
possibly because cooperatives are tenant-managed rather than
controlled by staff like non-profits.40 The success of affordable housing
options in Canada through limited and zero profit cooperatives
demonstrates the necessary role that limited-profit housing companies
play in maintaining affordable housing, especially for New York City.
The affordable housing issue in New York City will not be
remedied by only public housing or social housing alone; rather, the
vitality of both types of housing stock are crucial to the maintenance
of affordable housing for both lower- and middle-income families.
Exercise of a voluntary dissolution under § 35 of the PHFL can
produce two related results, both of which raise controversial public
policy questions.41 First, a Mitchell-Lama owner can reap a potentially
great profit from what was intended to be a government program for
middle-income housing.42 Second, middle-income tenants who live in
buildings that have dissolved and reconstituted as completely private
market rate housing may be forced to move out because of increased
rent or maintenance costs.43 Even if present tenants are protected,
apartments that become vacant will no longer be set aside.44
Therefore, Mitchell-Lama housing is essential to the success of
preserving affordable housing in New York City, both because of the
quantity of units it provides and because of the kind of living
arrangement it offers to tenants.
III. ABOUT MITCHELL-LAMA HOUSING, THE DISSOLUTION PROCESS,
AND EAST MIDTOWN PLAZA HOUSING CO. V. CUOMO
A. Creation of Mitchell-Lama Housing, Oversight, and the Buyout
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
Id.
McScotts, supra note 17, at 154.
Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 120–21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Provision
Sponsored by State Senator MacNeil Mitchell and Assemblyman
Alfred Lama, Article II of the New York Private Housing Finance Law
(commonly known as the “Mitchell-Lama Housing Program”) was
enacted in 1955 and governs limited-profit housing companies within
the state of New York.45 In response to the scarcity of affordable, safe,
and sanitary housing, the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program serves to
increase the development of adequate housing accommodations for
low- and middle-income families.46 Unlike traditional forms of public
housing that are largely operated by government agencies and funded
primarily by government financing, the Mitchell-Lama Housing
Program seeks to foster cooperation between both the public and
private sectors “through the most effective and economical
concentration and coordination of Federal, State, local and private
resources and efforts.”47 Thus, the program is designed to encourage
private enterprises to invest in housing companies that are subject to
laws regulating their rents, profits, dividends and dispositions of
property.48
The Mitchell-Lama Housing Program’s collaborative efforts
between government and private enterprises work through the city and
state’s provision of low-interest and long-term mortgages to private
housing companies that finance up to ninety-five percent of total
development costs.49 Additionally, under the Mitchell-Lama Housing
Program, private developers also may receive certain real estate tax
45

Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 5; see also N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 10
(McKinney 2013).
46
See N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 11 (“[T]here exists in municipalities in this state
a seriously inadequate supply of safe and sanitary dwelling or non-housekeeping
accommodations for families and persons of low income . . . due, in large measure, to
over-crowding and concentration of the population, improper planning, excessive
land coverage, lack of proper light, air and space, improper sanitary facilities and
inadequate protection from fire hazards.”); Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 5.
47
N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 11-a (“It is the purpose of this article to enable
municipalities to undertake projects directly or in combination with the Federal
government, private enterprise and any of the other responsible components of the
community, to accomplish the public purposes herein described through the most
effective and economical concentration and coordination of Federal, State, local and
private resources and efforts.”).
48
N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 11 (“[R]equire that provision be made by which
private free enterprise may be encouraged to invest in companies regulated by law as
to rents, profits, dividends and disposition of their property or franchises and engaged
in providing such housing facilities and other facilities incidental or appurtenant
thereto for families or persons of low income.”).
49
Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 5 (citing N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW §§ 22(2),
23(1)).

ROSCA(DO NOT DELETE)

954

6/22/2015 5:10 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:945

exemptions depending on the municipality.50 In exchange for these
benefits, the government requires Mitchell-Lama projects to comply
with guidelines that limit their profits, including rent regulations that
set the minimum and maximum rent prices based upon a tenant’s
annual income rather than market rates.51
To ensure adherence to the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program
guidelines and regulations, government agencies oversee the housing
project’s compliance. The type of government agency that conducts
this supervision is dependent upon which type of loan is financed to
the housing project. For example, the Department of Housing
Preservation and Development (“HPD”) supervises housing projects
with New York City mortgages, whereas the Department of Housing
and Community Renewal (“DHCR”) supervises projects with state
mortgages.52 The responsibilities of these agencies include collecting
debt service payments on loans, setting rent prices, reviewing project
expenditures, and generally enforcing regulations that govern their
specific developments.53 In addition, DHCR also publishes an Annual
Report with the names of all of the current Mitchell-Lama housing
projects and their original mortgage information, rent per unit, and
number of dwelling units.54
Along with stipulating the guidelines for participating in the
program, the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program also provides
instructions on how a housing project may exit the program. Although
its original enactment included this procedure for withdrawal, the
initial Mitchell-Lama housing statute prior to 1959 made exiting the
program very difficult since mortgage pre-payments to effectuate a
withdrawal were nearly impossible.55 Before a Mitchell-Lama housing
company could dissolve and withdraw from the program, it had to
meet the following conditions: (1) receive approval from the state or
municipal regulatory agency involved in its oversight; (2) ensure that
50

N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 33 (“Upon the consent of the local legislative body
of any municipality in which a project is or is to be located, the real property in a
project shall be exempt from local and municipal taxes, other than assessments for
local improvements, to the extent of all or part of the value of the property included
in such project which represents an increase over the assessed valuation of the real
property, both land and improvements, acquired for the project at the time of its
acquisition by the limited-profit housing company.”).
51
Anderson & Franzese, supra note 22, at 87–88 (citing Affordable No More, supra
note 19, at 5).
52
Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 5.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 123.
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thirty-five years had passed since the occupancy date; and (3) repay to
the municipality the total of all tax benefits that the project had
received.56 As a result, attempting to exit out of the Mitchell-Lama
Housing Program prior to 1959 was complicated and potentially
profitless.57
Because the original scheme for the Mitchell-Lama Housing
Program failed to create a significant number of affordable housing
projects, the legislature reacted by providing further incentives to
developers through the addition of an initial “buyout” provision.58
Under this amendment, owners of Mitchell-Lama projects had “the
option of dissolving the housing company on or after the fifteenth
anniversary of the occupancy date.”59 Additionally, a housing company
no longer needed consent from its respective regulatory agency for
dissolution, but still had to repay its government mortgage and
surrender its future tax exemptions.60 Even more enticing for
developers was that the 1959 amendment waived repayment of the tax
benefits previously received by the housing company.61 Subsequently,
the legislature amended this buyout provision in 1960 to increase the
minimum period before which a housing company may exit the
program from fifteen to twenty years. It also extended this buyout
privilege to projects with both municipal and state loans.62 Today,
these amendments only encourage the recent trend in Mitchell-Lama
housing dissolutions that is threatening the preservation of this type of
affordable housing. Dissolution would not only yield high profits in
light of the demand for more real estate space in New York City, but
the actual process for dissolving is now easier.
B. Dissolution and Reconstitution
Section 35 of the PHFL governs the process for withdrawal from
the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program (statutorily referred to as
“dissolution”).63 The current legislation, which includes the 1959 and
1960 amendments, effectuates dissolution by requiring developments
with loans made prior to May 1, 1959 to abide by the original, stricter

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id.
Id.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.
Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 124.
Id.
N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 35 (McKinney 2013).
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dissolution process. This former dissolution process required the
housing company to remain in the program for thirty-five years
regardless of whether the original mortgage was paid in full.64
Developments with loans made after May 1, 1959 may take advantage
of the 1959 and 1960 amendments by opting to buyout of the program
after twenty years from the occupancy date, assuming prepayment of
the mortgage and all indebtedness.65
Although § 35 of the PHFL no longer requires post-1959
developments to obtain formal “consent” from their respective
supervising agencies in order to proceed with dissolution, state and city
regulatory agencies have enacted procedures to oversee the
dissolution process.66 Procedurally, the housing development must
provide a “notice of intent” one year in advance of dissolution to both
its respective supervising agency and tenants67 along with detailed
information about the present and proposed future status of the
development.68 Subsequent to disseminating the notice of intent,
submitting any required documentation to the agency, and receiving
notice from the agency to proceed to the next step, the project
owner(s) may hold a public information meeting.69 The project owner
must provide notice of the public meeting to both tenants and public
officials, including state legislators who represent the district where the
housing development is located.70 Additionally, for the protection of
tenants, regulations exist to govern applicable transitions into rent
stabilization laws post-dissolution.71 As part of procedure, the local
taxing authorities will also terminate tax exemptions upon dissolution,
and the housing development owners must pay any fees owing under
the program.72 The process concludes when the DHCR (or HPD)
64

Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 6; N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 35(1).
Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 6; N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 35(2).
66
Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 126 (“In 1987, faced with the initial group of
Mitchell-Lama buyouts, New York State and New York City issued regulations
governing withdrawal from the program.”).
67
Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 6 (citing N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 9 § 1750 (1988));
N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 28 § 3-14(i) (2012).
68
Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 126.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. See also Affordable No More, supra note 19, at 6 (“If a housing project was
occupied prior to January 1, 1974, upon its buy out buildings that were occupied on
or after January 1, 1974 are not afforded any rental protections under the law and the
units become market rate housing. Tenants, however, may receive federal assistance
to cover increases if the developments originally received Federal Section 236 or
Section 8 housing assistance.”).
72
Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 126.
65
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issues a certificate to the Secretary of State that the housing
development owner(s) satisfied all legal prerequisites and that the
agency has “no objections” to the dissolution.73 Despite these elaborate
procedural barriers that may appear to be an obtainment of “consent”
from the supervising agency, these procedures do not confer power to
the regulatory agency to reject an application for dissolution if the
development’s owner(s) meet the statutory requirements.74
The basic process for dissolution applies to both rental and
cooperative projects, but additional requirements exist for cooperative
developments.75 Unlike rental property, cooperatives function without
a sole owner; rather, cooperatives operate similar to a corporation
where the residents are both the tenants and the shareholder-owners
of the housing company.76 Therefore, the housing company must
receive approval from its shareholders to expend money for
preliminary steps toward dissolution, such as paying for a
comparability study.77 In addition, according to the New York Court of
Appeals, the New York State Attorney General (“Attorney General”)
has the authority to oversee these types of Mitchell-Lama conversions
to ensure appropriate public disclosure and adherence to securities
law, requiring the Mitchell-Lama cooperative to file an offering plan
with the Attorney General if it is exercising its voluntary dissolution
rights.78 Finally, once the housing company has filed an offering plan
which has been approved by both the Attorney General and its
respective supervising agency, it must also hold a shareholder vote and
receive a two-thirds majority to effectuate the corporate act of
dissolution.79
Apart from the procedural and statutory requirements for
voluntary dissolution, Mitchell-Lama cooperatives that opt to exit from
the program may become a privatized corporation in two ways.
Traditionally, the old housing cooperative incorporated under the
Mitchell-Lama Housing Program that wishes to become a private
cooperative upon dissolution may transfer all its assets to a newly
73

Id.
Id.
75
Id. at 127.
76
DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 898 (7th ed. 2010) (“In a housing cooperative, the
title to the land and building is held by a corporation; the residents own all the shares
of stock in the corporation and control it through an elected board of directors.”).
77
Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 127 (citing NYCRR Tit. 9 § 1750.7-13(d)).
78
E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 N.E.2d 240, 244–45 (N.Y.
2012).
79
Sweet & Hack, supra note 21, at 127 (citing NYCRR Tit. 9 § 1750.7-13(d)).
74
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reconstituted for-profit cooperative.80 Alternatively, Mitchell-Lama
cooperatives are now attempting dissolution and reconstitution by
simply amending their certificates of incorporation and removing all
references to the PHFL.81 This amendment of the cooperative’s
certificate of incorporation is now being used to avoid paying real
estate transfer taxes with housing companies, arguing that the
transaction is not a “transfer or conveyance” of interests in real
property.82 Because owners are using this method to avoid tax liability,
this second option for privatization is now under scrutiny.
C. East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. v. Cuomo: The Mitchell-Lama
Dissolution (and Reconstitution) Process is an “Offer and Sale”
under Securities Law
East Midtown Plaza Housing Company (“East Midtown”) was a
Manhattan housing cooperative organized under the Mitchell-Lama
Housing Program with 746 units spanning across six buildings.83 East
Midtown attempted to invoke its voluntary dissolution rights under
PHFL § 35.84 In 2004, East Midtown originally proposed to dissolve and
privatize by transferring its assets to a newly-incorporated private
cooperative with a formal issuance of new shares.85 Because the
housing cooperative held a shareholder vote for privatization prior to
filing a cooperative offering plan with the Attorney General’s office,
both the Attorney General and the Department of Housing
Preservation and Development (the cooperative’s supervising agency)

80

N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 35(3) (“Upon such dissolution, title to the project
may be conveyed in fee to the owner or owners of its capital stock or to any corporation
designated by it or them for the purpose, or the company may be reconstituted
pursuant to appropriate laws relating to the formation and conduct of corporations.”).
81
See E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 243 (“Under the [2004] proposed
privatization plan, East Midtown would dissolve and all its assets would be transferred
to a newly incorporated private cooperative, accompanied by a formal issuance of new
shares in the entity . . . Unlike the 2004 proposal, the 2008 plan did not contemplate
a transfer of property or a physical exchange of shares. Rather, the privatization was
to be effectuated by an amendment to East Midtown’s certificate of incorporation.”).
82
Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086, 1087 (N.Y. 2014)
(“Plaintiff commenced this action seeking, among other things, a declaratory
judgment that the RPTT is inapplicable because the tax applies only to transfers and
conveyances of real property or economic interests in real property, from one entity
to another, and not to plaintiff’s exit from the Mitchell-Lama program as a result of a
‘reconstitution.’”).
83
E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 242–43.
84
Id.
85
Id.
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held the vote improper for failing to abide by dissolution procedures.86
In 2008, after following the proper procedural sequence, the Attorney
General accepted East Midtown’s offering plan. Instead of dissolving
and transferring shares to a new private cooperative, however, East
Midtown revised its original proposal to effectuate privatization
through amending its certificate of incorporation without requiring
the physical exchange of shares.87
The litigation arose because of the Attorney General’s refusal to
accept the amendment, not because East Midtown was attempting to
privatize through amending its certificate of incorporation. East
Midtown held a shareholder vote to pass the amendment using a “onevote-per-share rule” rather than a “one-vote-per-household” formula as
directed by its certificate of incorporation.88 Therefore, East Midtown
petitioned the court to compel the Attorney General to accept its
amendment and to declare “that the Attorney General lacked
jurisdiction over East Midtown’s efforts to exit the Mitchell-Lama
program on the theory that the Martin Act did not apply to the
transaction.”89 Essentially, East Midtown asked the court to determine
whether the Attorney General had jurisdiction to oversee MitchellLama cooperative conversions by requiring the cooperative to file an
offering plan with the Attorney General.90 The government argued
that the Attorney General has authority pursuant to the General
Business Law Article 23 (the “Martin Act”)91 which regulates the offer
and sale of securities within or from New York.92
The Martin Act requires that a person file an offering plan with
86

Id.
Id.
88
Id. at 243–44.
89
E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 244.
90
Id. (“East Midtown argues that it should not have been required to file an
offering plan because the Attorney General lacks authority over its withdrawal from
the Mitchel-Lama program.”). The secondary issue in this case involves whether a vote
for dissolution by a Mitchell-Lama cooperative whose certificate of incorporation is
expressly silent on the issue should be on a per share or a per apartment basis. Id. at
247.
91
Id. at 244 (“[H]owever it is packaged, the privatization of a Mitchell-Lama
cooperative complex comfortably falls within the parameters of the Martin Act.”).
92
Kralik v. 239 E. 79th St. Owners Corp., 832 N.E.2d 707, 709 (2005) (“The Martin
Act governs the offer and sale of securities in and from New York State, including
securities representing ‘participation interests’ in cooperative apartment buildings.
The Attorney General bears sole responsibility for implementing and enforcing the
Martin Act, which grants both regulatory and remedial powers aimed at detecting,
preventing and stopping fraudulent securities practices.”).
87
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the New York State Attorney General prior to making or participating
in “a public offering or sale” of securities consisting of participation
interests or investments in real estate.93 Under the Martin Act, the
Attorney General reviews cooperative apartments’ “disclosures
required by General Business Law § 352-e for sufficiency” and
investigates and initiates civil or criminal actions when fraud is
suspected.94 The purpose of these required disclosures is to safeguard
the purchasers of cooperatives and condominiums.95 East Midtown
argued that the Martin Act does not apply to a Mitchell-Lama
cooperative attempting to privatize upon dissolution by amending its
certificate of incorporation, because the transaction does not involve
an “offering or sale” of securities.96
The New York Court of Appeals held that the Attorney General
does have jurisdiction to govern the dissolution and privatization of a
Mitchell-Lama cooperative pursuant to the Martin Act.97 To arrive at
this conclusion, the Court analyzed whether the act of amending a
Mitchell-Lama cooperative’s certificate of incorporation as a means to
privatize amounted to a “sale or offering” for the purposes of the
Martin Act.98 In its analysis, the Court looked to federal securities law
for guidance, acknowledging that the Martin Act was drafted similarly
to the federal securities acts of 1933 and 1934.99 In support of its
practice of referencing federal securities law and federal court
decisions interpreting federal securities law, the Court of Appeals
noted that the remedial purposes of the state and federal securities
statutes are the same and that “the General Business Law § 352e–(1)(a)
makes specific reference to the Federal Securities Act of 1933.”100
With regard to federal securities law, federal courts have held that
in certain situations altering the rights of shareholders of existing
securities can constitute a “purchase or sale.”101 When determining
93

E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 244 (citing GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-e).
Kralik, 832 N.E.2d at 709.
95
Kerusa Co. LLC v. W10Z/515 Real Estate Ltd. P’ship, 906 N.E.2d 1049, 879
(N.Y. 2009).
96
E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 244.
97
Id. at 244–46.
98
Id. at 245.
99
Id. (“Although the Martin Act was enacted in 1921, its present form generally
tracks the Federal securities acts of 1933 and 1934. Accordingly, we have looked to
Federal court decisions construing those statutes when interpreting our own.”)
(quoting People v. Landes, 645 N.E.2d 716, 718 (N.Y. 1994)).
100
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Rachmani Corp., 525
N.E.2d 704, 726 (N.Y. 1988) (citations omitted)).
101
E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 245.
94
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whether a change in the rights of shareholders amounts to a “purchase
or sale” of securities, federal courts generally consider the following
factors: (1) “whether there has occurred such significant change in the
nature of the investment or in the investment risks as to amount to a
new investment;”102 and (2) what the economic reality of the
transaction is and “whether it lends itself to fraud in the making of an
investment decision.”103 New York courts have similarly applied the
federal courts’ analysis of placing emphasis on substance and
economic reality over form when determining a sale or purchase of
security.104
In East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. v. Cuomo, the Court found that
East Midtown’s act of amending its certificate of incorporation to
remove itself from the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program would result
in substantial changes to the nature of its shareholders’ interests.105
After effectuating privatization, the tenant-shareholders would be able
to sell their shares at market rate prices, whereas under the MitchellLama program, the same shareholders would be limited to the not-forprofit resale price of shares under Mitchell-Lama law.106 Tenantshareholders no longer would be limited to selling their shares to
purchasers who meet the qualifications of Mitchell-Lama’s income
restrictions for tenants. Additionally, privatization would result in the
loss of government subsidized financing and certain property tax
exemptions and tax benefits.107 Effectuating privatization may also
result in potential increases to maintenance charges for each tenantshareholder. Privatization would also enable the cooperative to
impose a “flip tax” to be paid to the housing company from the
proceeds of each subsequent sale of shares after dissolution.108
In light of these changes in shareholders’ rights upon
102

Gelles v. TDA Indus., Inc., 44 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905
(1978)) (internal quotations omitted).
103
E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 245 (quoting THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, § 12.6.[1] (2013)); see also Rathborne
v. Rathborne, 683 F.2d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The crucial question is not whether
the transaction fulfills the requisites of a common law sale; the core issue is whether
the transaction has transformed the plaintiff into the functional equivalent of a
purchaser or seller-has the plaintiff been forced to exchange his stock for shares
representing a participation in a substantially different enterprise?”).
104
E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 245.
105
Id. at 246.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
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privatization, the Court of Appeals correctly deduced that excluding
this type of cooperative conversion from the ambit of the Martin Act
would elevate form over substance.109 The Court concluded that
whether the housing company effectuates dissolution through a
formal reconstitution and physical exchange of shares or through
amending its certificate of incorporation, the economic realities of
both transactions have the same results—”privatization and market
value resale potential.”110 Therefore, to protect the public from any
fraud in the “offering and sale” of securities,111 the Attorney General
properly has jurisdiction to require a Mitchell-Lama cooperative
contemplating dissolution to file an offering plan pursuant to the
Martin Act so shareholders can be informed when deciding the
benefits and drawbacks of withdrawal from the Mitchell-Lama Housing
Program.112
IV. MITCHELL-LAMA DISSOLUTION: TAX ISSUES PROMPTED BY TRUMP
VILLAGE SECTION 3, INC. V. CITY OF NEW YORK
Similar to East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. v. Cuomo, where the
Court had to determine whether the transaction of amending a
Mitchell-Lama cooperative’s certificate of incorporation to dissolve
and reconstitute was an offering and sale under securities law, the
Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York also had to
categorize the transaction under tax law. Trump Village Section 3, Inc.
(“Trump Village”) consists of three, twenty-three-story buildings in
Brooklyn that incorporated in 1961 under the Mitchell-Lama Housing
Program.113 Like any typical Mitchell-Lama cooperative, Trump Village
received a low interest mortgage loan from the government and real
property tax exemptions but had to abide by the program’s restrictions
on resale to third parties.114 Trump Village remained in the MitchellLama Housing Program for approximately forty-five years and repaid

109

Id.
E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 246.
111
Id. at 245 (“We have emphasized that General Business Law § 352–e
(1)(a) should be liberally construed to give effect to its remedial purpose of protecting
the public from fraudulent exploitation in the offer and sale of securities”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting All Seasons Resorts v. Abrams, 497 N.E.2d 33, 35
(N.Y. 1986)).
112
Id. at 246.
113
Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 974 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013) aff’d, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014).
114
Id.
110
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its governmental mortgage loan on October 15, 2005.115 In 2007, with
the permission of the State of New York and upon receiving the
necessary shareholders’ vote, Trump Village elected to exit out of the
Mitchell-Lama Program pursuant to § 35 of the PHFL, reconstituting
itself as a private corporation under the New York Business
Corporation Law116 through amending its certificate of
incorporation.117 Trump Village removed language referencing the
PHFL from its stock certificates and bylaws, exchanging old stock
certificates for new ones without altering the number of shares.118 The
housing company kept its original name, number of and names of its
shareholders, and its tax identification number.119 After Trump Village
terminated its participation in the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program,
the New York City Department of Finance (“City Department”) issued
a tax deficiency notice to Trump Village in the amount of
$21,149,592.50 with interest and penalties for failing to pay a real
property transfer tax (hereinafter “RPTT”) pursuant to New York State
Tax Law § 1201(b) and Administrative Code of the City of New York §
11-2102(a).120
The issue in this case hinged on the interpretation of New York
City’s tax law, determining whether amending a Mitchell-Lama
cooperative’s certificate of incorporation to effectuate privatization
constitutes a taxable transfer or conveyance for the purposes of
Administrative Code of the City of New York § 11-2102(a), a city tax
empowered by New York State Tax Law § 1201(b).121 Generally and
with qualifications, Administrative Code of the City of New York § 112102(a) imposes a tax “on each deed at the time of delivery by a
grantor to a grantee when the consideration for the real property and
any improvement thereon (whether or not included in the same deed)
exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.”122 The tax is applicable to
conveyances of real property exceeding $25,000.123 While Trump
115

Id. at 472.
The New York Business Law governs the formation and dissolution of private
corporations. N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 201 (McKinney 2013) (“A corporation may be formed
under this chapter for any lawful business purpose or purposes except to do in this
state any business for which formation is permitted under any other statute of this state
unless such statute permits formation under this chapter.”).
117
Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc., 974 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Administrative Code of the City of New York § 11-2102(a).
123
Id.
116

ROSCA(DO NOT DELETE)

964

6/22/2015 5:10 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:945

Village argued that reconstitution under the Mitchell-Lama Housing
Program is not a conveyance of real property,124 the City Department
considered the transaction a conveyance of underlying real property
between the “old” Mitchell-Lama cooperative to the “new” private
cooperative with the certificate of incorporation acting as the deed for
the transfer.125

The New York Supreme Court “awarded summary judgment to
the City defendants declaring that Trump Village’s actions constituted
a ‘transfer’ and a ‘conveyance’ of real property, and that Trump Village
was subject to the RPTT.”126 The plaintiff, however, appealed to the
appellate division, which reversed the lower court’s decision. The
appellate division agreed with Trump Village and found that Trump
Village “did not transfer or convey real property or an interest in real
property within the meaning of New York State Tax Law § 1201(b) and
Administrative Code of City of New York § 11-2102(a),” holding that
the housing company essentially remained the same entity except for
the removal of some restrictions.127 Alternatively, the appellate division
also noted that an exception under § 11-2106(b)(8) of the city’s tax
code that imposes the RPTT specifically to transfers of land and
buildings to a cooperative housing corporation, even if the
transactions merely effect a change in ownership, was inapplicable. 128
It found the exception irrelevant by concluding that § 11-2102(a) did
not apply on its face to a housing cooperative terminating its
participation in the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program.129 The City
Department appealed the case to the New York Court of Appeals, and

124

Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 974 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013) aff’d, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014).
125
Id. at 474 (“Here, the City defendants essentially contend that, by voluntarily
dissolving and subsequently reconstituting, Trump Village became a new corporation
and that, accordingly, the amended certificate of incorporation constituted a deed.
Thus, they conclude that the purported deed was delivered at the time of execution,
and that the purported deed was delivered by an ‘old’ Trump Village to a ‘new’ Trump
Village.”).
126
Id. at 472–73.
127
Id. at 475.
128
Id. (“[T]he City defendants cannot establish the applicability of the RPTT by
reference to a statutory exemption which would only be relevant if the tax were
applicable in the first instance”) (citing Matter of Grace v. New York State Tax
Common., 332 N.E.2d 886 (N.Y. 1975)).
129
Id.
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the Court affirmed the appellate division’s decision.130
V. THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS GOT IT WRONG IN TRUMP
VILLAGE SECTION 3, INC.
A. The Decision in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. Elevates Form over
Substance
Although confronted with the same transaction, the Court of
Appeals in East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. categorized the voluntary
dissolution of a Mitchell-Lama cooperative as an “offering and sale,”
an essential transfer under securities law.131 In contrast, the Court in
Trump Village Section 3, Inc. did not categorize the same method of
dissolution and privatization as a “transfer” for the purposes of
assessing real estate transfer taxes.132 In fact, the Court in Trump Village
Section 3, Inc. glossed over the relevance of the fairly recent decision in
East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. While the Court explicitly recognized
that “[t]he [prior] decision addressed the impact of privatization on
shareholders and focused on the rights of the shareholders, and the
substantial changes in the nature of their interests,” the Court dismissed the
significance of its only precedent regarding Mitchell-Lama
dissolutions.133
With one conclusory statement and without a
developed discussion of why its prior decision was not controlling, the
Court simply stated that “[East Midtown Plaza Housing Co.] lends no
support for defendants’ imposition of an RPTT where there has been
a Mitchell-Lama privatization.”134 The Court failed to consider,
however, that its reasoning in East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. for how
the dissolution of Mitchell-Lama housing affects and changes the
substantial rights of its shareholders directly supports reversing the
appellate division in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York.135
Amending one’s certificate of incorporation to dissolve a MitchellLama housing company is a valid transfer that triggers real property
transfer taxes, considering the significant changes in ownership rights
and in the nature of the property.
Moreover, analysis of the relevant tax laws at issue in Trump Village
130

Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086, 1087 (N.Y.

2014).
131

E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 N.E.2d 240, 246 (N.Y. 2012).
Compare E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 240, with Trump Vill. Section 3,
Inc., 24 N.E.3d at 1086.
133
Trump Village Section 3, Inc., 24 N.E.3d at 1089 (emphasis added).
134
Id.
135
See E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., 981 N.E.2d at 246.
132
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Section 3, Inc. demonstrates that the voluntary dissolution of a MitchellLama cooperative through amending its certificate of incorporation is
a taxable transfer contemplated by both the New York State and New
York City tax laws. The relevant statute discussed in Trump Village
Section 3, Inc. is § 1201 of the New York State tax law, which gives New
York City authority to promulgate tax codes, including Administrative
Code of the City of New York § 11-2102.136 The appellate division in
Trump Village Section 3, Inc. noted that New York City only argued for
the imposition of the city RPTT on the basis of part (a) of § 11-2102
and never reached the merits of whether a voluntary dissolution of a
Mitchell-Lama cooperative is considered a taxable transfer under part
(b) or part (c) of the city’s tax code.137 Generally, § 11-2102(a) requires
imposition of a tax on “each deed at the time of delivery by a grantor
to a grantee when the consideration for the real property and any
improvement thereon (whether or not included in the same deed)
exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.”138 The subsequent subsections of
part (a) provide the details as to how the tax is applied and at what
rates, but the Court of Appeals in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. was only
concerned about whether or not the tax should be imposed upon a
particular kind of Mitchell-Lama cooperative’s voluntary dissolution.139
To understand the different components of § 11-2102(a), the
administrative code provides definitions for significant terms used in
subsequent sections of the city’s tax law. For example, the relevant
term “deed” is defined as:
Any document or writing (other than a will), regardless of
where made, executed or delivered, whereby any real
property or interest therein is created, vested, granted,
bargained, sold, transferred, assigned or otherwise conveyed,
including any such document or writing whereby any
136

N.Y. TAX § 1201 (McKinney 2013) (“[A]ny city in this state having a population
of one million or more, acting through its local legislative body, is hereby authorized
and empowered to adopt and amend local laws imposing in any such city any or all of
the types of taxes set forth in the following subdivisions of this section, such taxes to
be administered and collected by the fiscal officers of such city.”).
137
Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 974 N.Y.S.2d 469, 475 n.1 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2013) aff’d, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014).
138
ADMIN. CODE OF THE CITY OF N.Y. § 11-2102(a).
139
Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014) (“We
are presented with the following question: Does a taxable transfer pursuant to Tax Law
§ 1201 (b) and section 11-2102 (a) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York
occur when a residential housing cooperative corporation terminates its participation
in the Mitchell-Lama program and amends its certificate of incorporation as part of its
voluntary dissolution and reconstitution as a cooperative corporation governed by the
Business Corporation Law?”).
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leasehold interest in real property is granted, assigned or
surrendered.140
For the purposes of a Mitchell-Lama cooperative dissolution, the deed
in the transaction is manifested in the certificate of incorporation. By
amending the certificate of incorporation, the cooperative, in writing,
is able to transfer, grant, or assign the real property—the cooperative
building and possibly the land underneath it—from the old affordable
housing cooperative under the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program to the
new private housing cooperative that will be incorporated under the
state’s Business Corporation Law. The notion of a “deed” for the
relevant city tax law is loosely defined to contemplate other written
documents that effectively provide the mode for transferring real
property interests, demonstrating an emphasis on substance over form.

Another pertinent definition for understanding § 11-2102(a) is
the meaning of the term “economic interest in real property,” which
the code defines as including “the ownership of shares of stock in a
corporation which owns real property.”141 In both East Midtown Plaza
Housing Co. and Trump Village Section 3, Inc., there was no dispute
among the parties that the shareholders of a Mitchell-Lama
cooperative hold economic interests in real property.
Like
shareholders in traditional private cooperatives, the tenant-owners of
a Mitchell-Lama cooperative each hold shares within the housing
company and have rights to the real property where the tenantshareholders reside.142
The Court of Appeals in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. also did not
directly address the administrative code’s § 11-2106(b) exemption. It
agreed with the appellate division, articulating that because § 112102(a) does not apply on its face, the exemption “only applies where
there has been a conveyance in the first place, and thus, because there
was no conveyance, the exemptions and the exceptions to those
exemptions are not relevant.”143 Nevertheless, the Court in reaching
its conclusion still echoed the language and concerns of § 11-2106(b)
even if it stated that the exemption was irrelevant. The Court
140

ADMIN. CODE OF THE CITY OF N.Y. § 11-2101(2).
Id. § 11-2101(6).
142
NYC Administrative Code § 11-2101 (defining real property as “[e]very estate
or right, legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent, in lands, tenements
or hereditaments, which are located in whole or in part within the city of New York”).
143
Trump Village Section 3, Inc., 24 N.E.3d at 1089.
141
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addressed whether or not Trump Village became a new corporation,144
which is relevant because under the § 11-2106 exemption the tax
imposed by this code shall not apply to:
A deed, instrument or transaction conveying or transferring
real property or an economic interest therein that effects a
mere change of identity or form of ownership or organization to the
extent the beneficial ownership of such real property or
economic interest therein remains the same, other than a
conveyance to a cooperative housing corporation of the land and
building or buildings comprising the cooperative dwelling or
dwellings.145
Not only did the Court find that the city’s transfer tax did not apply,
but the Court supported its conclusion by reasoning that Trump
Village remained the same entity. Yet, the § 11-2106 exemption applies
specifically to transactions where the ownership or organization of the
real property or economic interest effectively remains the same.
Therefore, by providing a carve out for instances where an
organization reorganizes through a mere change in identity, the
legislature qualitatively recognized that these types of transactions
would normally fall within the ambit of this tax code as written, but for
the inclusion of this exemption.
The Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. incorrectly dismissed the
relevance of the § 11-2106(b)(8) exemption. The legislature would
not have explicitly addressed the kinds of transactions that result in the
ownership or organization remaining the same if these types of
transfers would not otherwise fall with § 11-2102 in the first instance.
Therefore, not only does § 11-2102 apply to Mitchell-Lama cooperative
conversions to for-profit entities, but the method of conveyance at
issue in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. is described specifically by the
legislature in § 11-2106(b)(8).
Although § 11-2106(b)(8) functions to waive the RPTT for certain
transactions, dissolution and reconstitution of a Mitchell-Lama
cooperative through an amendment of its certificate of incorporation
is excluded from the § 11-2106(b)(8) waiver in two ways. Most
conspicuously, the statute explicitly provides a caveat that bars
conveyances to cooperative housing corporations of real property
comprising a cooperative dwelling from being exempt from the

144

Id. at *4–6. (“We first address defendants’ argument that Trump Village became
an entirely new corporation.”).
145
Administrative Code of the City of NY § 11-2106(b)(8) (emphasis added).
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RPTT.146 Here, the transfer of economic interest in real property is
between the old Mitchell-Lama cooperative and the newly
reincorporated private cooperatives. The plain text of § 11-2106(b)(8)
alone already limits the waiver of RPTT from extending to conveyances
to cooperative dwelling units.
Alternatively, the § 11-2106(b)(8) exemption may not even apply
as an initial matter because the transaction involves a corporation
significantly changing the substance of its ownership, organization,
and operation so as to create a new corporation. As the Court of
Appeals reiterated in East Midtown Plaza Housing Co., the dissolution
process for a Mitchell-Lama cooperative involves a substantive change
of rights and interests of the shareholders, not just a mere change in
identity or ownership.147 Therefore, assuming that § 11-2102 on its face
applies since Mitchell-Lama conversions are conveyances of real
property through amendments to their certificate of incorporations
(effectively deeds) for amounts over the statutory requirement, the
transaction may be characterized as beyond mere changes in
ownership. Thus, these cooperatives which are attempting to privatize
would not be exempt from paying RPTT under § 11-2106(b)(8).
The Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. failed to recognize that
amending one’s certificate of incorporation to remove references to
the PHFL and placing the prior Mitchell-Lama housing company
within the purview of the Business Corporation Law is not just a mere
technical change in form. The once affordable housing company that
functioned under the restrictions, protections, and benefits of the
Mitchell-Lama housing program will dissolve and seize to exist. As a
result, the newly reorganized housing company will be subject to the
private housing market without supervision from government agencies
like the Department of Housing and Community Renewal or the
Housing Preservation Department.
Nevertheless, the Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. ignored the
substantial changes that shareholders of a Mitchell-Lama housing
company endure after privatization.
It simply noted that
reincorporation “cannot be deemed the formation of a new
corporation, but should be regarded as the continuation of the
existing one.”148 In support of this conclusion, the Court improperly
146

Id.
E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 N.E.2d 240, 246 (N.Y. 2012).
148
Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086, 1089 (N.Y. 2014)
(citing People ex rel. Consol. Kansas City Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Secretary of State, 13
A.D. 50, 51 (N.Y. App. Div.1897)).
147
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relied on People ex rel. Consol. Kansas City Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Secretary
of State, a case from 1857 involving an already private corporation (not
even a housing corporation) that amended its certificate of
incorporation to proceed under the Business Corporation Law. This
case, however, is distinguishable because it involves an already existing
private company that was once incorporated under the Manufacturing
Act of 1848 but had decided to amend its certificate of incorporation
so that it may be organized under the Business Corporation Law.149
With the dissolution of a Mitchell-Lama housing company, the
change in substantial ownership rights is much more significant than
substituting reference to one act over another. Amending its
certificate of incorporation to remove references to the PHFL is akin
to the other available dissolution option where the housing company
formally transfers its assets to a newly-incorporated private cooperative
with a formal issuance of new shares.150 The economic reality of the
Mitchell-Lama cooperative transforms to the point that tenant rents
are affected, the value of shareholders’ units increase dramatically, and
future tenant-purchasers will no longer be subjected to income
restrictions.151 Contrary to the Court’s interpretation in Trump Village
Section 3, Inc., the prior Mitchell-Lama affordable housing company
does not continue after privatization. It dissolves completely. The
housing cooperative that reemerges from this process is wholly private
and subject to market rates. Thus, the change from a quasi-public
housing company to a purely private housing company is a significant
and substantive shift beyond mere formalities, necessitating the
payment of the relevant real property transfer taxes.
B. Analogies between New York City and the State’s Real Estate
Transfer Tax
Tax legislation should be applied in a way that gives effect to the
economic substance of a transaction.152 To understand the full extent
and appropriate implementation of tax legislation, courts should be
cognizant of its legislative history. For example, Administrative Code
of the City of NY § 11-2102 mirrors New York State Tax Law § 1402(a),
which states that a real estate transfer tax is “imposed on each
149

See generally People ex rel. Consol. Kan. City Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Sec’y of State,
13 A.D. 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897).
150
See generally discussion supra Part C.
151
Id.
152
595 Investors Ltd. P’ship v. Biderman, 531 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1988).
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conveyance of real property or interest therein when the consideration
exceeds five hundred dollars, at the rate of two dollars for each five
hundred dollars or fractional part thereof.”153 The state tax law
describes conveyance as:
the transfer or transfers of any interest in real property by any
method, including but not limited to sale, exchange,
assignment, surrender, mortgage foreclosure, transfer in lieu
of foreclosure, option, trust indenture, taking by eminent
domain, conveyance upon liquidation or by a receiver, or
transfer or acquisition of a controlling interest in any entity
with an interest in real property[.]154
Again, the definition of “transfer” for the purposes of the state real
property tax does not exclude the transaction involved when a
Mitchell-Lama cooperative amends its certificate of incorporation to
effectuate dissolution and privatization. Like the New York City
administrative code, the state tax statute also has an exemption to its
real estate transfer tax (RETT) similar to Administrative Code of the
City of NY § 11-2106(b). The New York State Tax Law § 1405(b)(6)
provides that the state RETT does not apply when the conveyance
“effectuates a mere change of identity or form of ownership or
organization where there is no change in beneficial ownership.”155
Like the New York City code, the state tax law contemplates
transactions where an entity reorganizes and provides an exemption to
the tax law for those instances. For example, the New York State Tax
Appeals Tribunal held that § 1405(b)(6) did not apply to a merger of
CBS Corporation and Viacom, Inc.156 Like Trump Village Section 3, Inc.,
the merger involved a restatement in Viacom’s certificate of
incorporation, but no issuance of “new” stock.157 The Tribunal held
that the merger “resulted in a taxable conveyance of an interest in real
property by CBS to Viacom.”158 In reaching this conclusion, the
administrative law judge noted that the exemption under § 1405(b)(6)
only applied where there was no change in “beneficial ownership” and
153

N.Y. STATE TAX LAW § 1402(a). Similar to Administrative Code of the City of NY
§ 11-2102, this real property transfer tax contemplates a monetary threshold in order
to apply to the transaction.
154
N.Y. STATE TAX LAW § 1401(e).
155
N.Y. STATE TAX LAW § 1405(b)(6).
156
Maria T. Jones and Melissa S. Blades, 2006-2007 Survey of New York Law: Article:
State and Local Taxation, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1133, 1140 (2008) (citing In re Viacom,
Inc., 5 N.Y. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 405-723, at 45,607, 45,610 (N.Y.S. Tax App. Trib. May
3, 2007)).
157
Id. at 1141.
158
Id.
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where “beneficial ownership” is something more than a mere financial
interest, articulating that “beneficial ownership” was marked by
“dominion and control over the property.”159
In applying the statutory interpretation of the Viacom case to a
Mitchell-Lama cooperative attempting dissolution, a change in
“dominion and control over the property” is evident.
Most
significantly, after dissolution, the shareholders will be able to control
the selling price of the unit. In addition, shareholders will also be free
from the restriction imposed by the Mitchell-Lama program of
conveying their units to only buyers within certain income ranges. The
housing corporation will also have control over the ability to impose
“flip taxes” on sales subsequent to dissolution in order to raise revenue
for the cooperative. If the state collects tax revenue from RETT upon
dissolution of a Mitchell-Lama cooperative, then New York City should
not be barred from receiving this revenue when the city code and the
state tax law are nearly identical in language and function.
To support the contention that the New York State real property
transfer tax is applicable to a Mitchell-Lama cooperative effectuating
dissolution through amending its certificate of incorporation, the New
York State Department of Taxation and Finance (the “Department”)
released an advisory opinion on the issue.160 The advisory opinion
confronted the same transaction before the Court in Trump Village.
Section 3, Inc. where a property located in New York City, organized
under the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program, and supervised by a
government agency, DHCR, attempted to dissolve and privatize
through amending its certificate of incorporation.161 The Department
concluded that “the conversion of the not-for-profit housing company
(PHFL company) to a private cooperative housing corporation (BCL
corporation) constitutes a conveyance . . . of the real property
comprising the cooperative dwelling, subject to the [state real estate
transfer tax].”162
The Department also addressed similar concerns that the Court
in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. considered—namely, whether the
transaction constituted a transfer or conveyance of real property and
whether the transaction fell into the exemption with the tax law with

159

Id.
See N.Y. State Comm’r of Taxation & Fin., Advisory Op. TSB-A-10(2)(R),
available at http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/advisory_opinions/real_estate/a10_2r.pdf.
161
Id.
162
Id.
160
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regard to change in ownership.163 The Department recognized that
while the transfer of ownership of real property may not be the
conventional method, dissolution of the non-for-profit housing
cooperative must still occur in order to remove the restrictions
imposed by the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program.164 Unlike the Court
in Trump Village Section 3, Inc., which did not find removal of these
limitations significant (considering it failed to even discuss them),165
the Department noted that the dissolution and privatization would
result in a “substantive change in the nature of the ownership of the
entity that owns the property,” affecting the benefits and restrictions
of the appurtenant shares.166
Both state and city real estate transfer tax statutes also allude to
the need for “consideration” as part of the transfer of real property
which would implicate these taxes.167 Although not addressed by the
Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc., the Department had no issue in
finding consideration in these types of transactions, referring to
consideration as the “amount of cash received by the Sponsor; the
amount of any mortgages, liens, or encumbrances on the real
property; and the fair market value of the shares in the cooperative
housing corporation after reconstitution.”168 In analyzing how the state
real estate transfer tax is implicated upon this transaction, the
Department first recognized that the significant changes in rights by
the shareholders regarding ownership of the cooperative dwelling

163

Id.
Id.
165
Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 24 N.E.3d 1086, 1088 (N.Y. 2014)
(“While defendants assert that a new corporation must have been formed because
Trump Village had to ‘dissolve’ under the PHFL before ‘reconstituting’ as a
corporation no longer governed by the restrictions of the PHFL, the corporation in
the amended certificate of incorporation, Trump Village Section 3, Inc., is the same
corporation that was named in the original certificate of incorporation.”); see also
Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York, 974 N.Y.S.2d 469, 474–75 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013) aff’d, 24 N.E.3d 1086 (N.Y. 2014) (“Upon amending its certificate of
incorporation, Trump Village remained the same entity, although it was relieved of
various restrictions previously imposed upon it by the Mitchell-Lama housing
program.”).
166
N.Y. State Comm’r of Taxation & Fin., supra note160.
167
Compare Administrative Code of the City of NY § 11-2102(a) (“tax is hereby
imposed on each deed at the time of delivery by a grantor to a grantee when the
consideration for the real property . . . .”) (emphasis added) with N.Y. CLS TAX § 1402
(“A tax is hereby imposed on each conveyance of real property or interest therein
when the consideration exceeds five hundred dollars . . . .”) (emphasis added).
168
N.Y. State Comm’r of Taxation & Fin., supra note 160.
164
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already implicate the state real estate transfer tax on its face.
Nevertheless, like the city tax law, the state transfer tax also has an
exemption for transactions that effectuate mere changes in identity.
Here, the Department held that amending its certificate of
incorporation was a mere change in ownership or organization,
especially because the percentage of shares in the old cooperative
would remain for the new cooperative. Like the city tax law, however,
the state exemption to RETT has a caveat for “conveyances to a
cooperative housing corporation of real property comprising the
cooperative dwellings.”169 Hence, the transaction falls within the
purview of this state tax statute, and its special exemption for mere
changes in ownership does not apply.
The legislative history of § 1201—which authorizes New York
City’s ability to impose the real estate transfer tax—also supports the
contention that tax statutes like Administrative Code of the City of New
York § 11-2102 were intended to close gaps and loopholes in real
property transfer taxes by “permitting the taxation of transfers of
controlling interest in corporations . . . which own real property.”170
Allowing a Mitchell-Lama cooperative to take advantage of a loophole
by avoiding an otherwise applicable transfer tax due to the method of
how the cooperative dissolves and privatizes would be contrary to the
purpose for these types of transfer taxes. Section 1201 was amended
to include real property “transfers of controlling economic interest in
real property,” recognizing that it is common to convey property
without having it reflected in a traditional “deed.”171 Both the
legislative history of § 1201 and the analysis of the Department
regarding § 1405(b)(6) in ruling that these types of Mitchell-Lama
dissolutions are subject to the state RETT manifest the purpose of
these tax statutes, which is to give effect to the “substance of the
transaction rather than legal form.”172
VII. CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals ignored its own precedent and
issued a misguided decision in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. The Court
in East Midtown Plaza Housing Co. had already ruled that amending a
Mitchell-Lama cooperative’s certificate of incorporation to remove
references to the Private Housing Finance Law is considered an
169
170
171
172

Id.
1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2636–37(McKinney); 1981 NY Legis. Ann., at 481.
1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2636–37(McKinney).
Id.
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“offering or sale” for the purposes of securities law. Rather than
remain consistent and provide uniformity among laws regarding these
same types of conversions, the Court of Appeals distinguished East
Midtown Plaza Housing Co. in a cursory fashion. The Court was
persuaded that the housing company named in the amended
certificate of incorporation was the same named company in the
original Mitchell-Lama certificate of incorporation, despite its
transformation into a completely private entity that would no longer
be subject to any of the Mitchell-Lama housing regulations. Thus, the
Court in Trump Village Section 3, Inc. concluded that this method of
effectuating dissolution and privatization by a Mitchell-Lama
cooperative is not a “transfer” pursuant to city and state tax laws.
Analysis of New York City’s relevant real property transfer tax, however,
demonstrates that this dissolution method is a transfer of a real
property interest subject to real property transfer tax obligations.
Additionally, both the state and local real estate tax laws contemplate
transfers of property ownership or controlling interest through
reorganization within the plain reading of the tax codes. Further,
because New York City’s tax law is based on the state’s tax law, the
legislative history behind the state’s tax statute reveals the purpose of
these types of transfer taxes. A recent advisory opinion held that the
state real estate transfer tax applies to a Mitchell-Lama cooperative
seeking privatization through amending its certificate of
incorporation. Therefore, New York City’s similar transfer tax should
also apply to the same transaction.
Moreover, public policy concerns over preserving affordable
housing stock in New York City supported the reversal of the appellate
division in Trump Village Section 3, Inc; yet, the Court of Appeals
affirmed without considering the implications of its decision. Allowing
these housing companies to gain the benefit of being exempted from
real property transfer taxes both in the initial formation of the
Mitchell-Lama housing and now in exiting the program would only
provide more incentives for these cooperatives to privatize.
Considering the present affordable housing crisis in New York City, the
judiciary should have given effect to the purposes of these tax statutes.
Generally, these real estate transfer taxes are more lenient on housing
companies attempting to become affordable housing stock—to
encourage the development of much needed affordable housing units.
The state and local legislatures did not intend to forgo these transfer
tax revenues for housing entities attempting to gain a profit by
converting out of affordable housing programs to become private
market rate housing. This recent decision in Trump Village Section 3,
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Inc. incentivizes the dissolution of low- and middle-income housing by
allowing these entities to take advantage of tax waivers intended to
promote the creation of affordable housing. The only option left for
preserving current Mitchell-Lama housing is through legislative action
that would explicitly require all Mitchell-Lama housing cooperatives
that are leaving the affordable housing program to pay the proper
transfer taxes, regardless of how the cooperative attempts to effectuate
dissolution. Otherwise, New York City risks further depletion of this
critical affordable housing stock.

